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The Constitutional Prism of 
Louis-Philippe Pigeon and Jean Beetz 
William E. CONKLIN * 
Après avoir expliqué ce qu'il entend par notion de constitution (' 'image 
of a constitution'^, l'auteur examine les écrits judiciaires et doctrinaux des 
juges Pigeon et Beetz dans le but de voir quelle idée l'un et l'autre se faisaient 
de ce qu'est une constitution. Ces écrits, selon lui, se fondent sur des 
conceptions articulées du rôle des textes comme source du droit, du rôle des 
normes comme prétention de départ de l'analyse constitutionnelle, du rôle 
scientifique du juriste et, enfin, des positions respectives des différentes règles 
de droit. L'auteur conclut que cette façon de voir s'inscrit à l'intérieur d'une 
conception globale du droit dont les tenants et aboutissants n'ont jamais été 
vraiment étudiés. 
After introducing the concept of an "image of a constitution ", Mr 
Conklin examines the federalism writings and judgments of Justices Pigeon 
and Beetz with a view to identifying the bounderies of their respective 
concepts of a constitution. He argues that their writings presuppose coherent 
answers to such boundaries as the role of a text as the primary source of law, 
the posited character of rules, rules as the starting point of constitutional 
analysis, the scientistic role of a lawyer, and a horizontal I vertical spectrum of 
posited rules. Mr. Conklin claims that their understanding of law collapses 
into a more primordial image of law whose boundaries we have for too long 
left unexamined. 
* William E. Conklin, of the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. 
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The central issue of studies of Canadian federalism in the English-
speaking scholarly literature is that of centralism versus decentralism. During 
the early years of the Canadian realist movement, Bora Laskin exposed the 
decentralist political bias of the Privy Council '. Alan Cairns subsequently 
demonstrated how Laskin had interpreted a centralist bias into Privy Council 
judgments2. During the 1950's and 60's, William Lederman elaborated a 
coherent theory of constitutional adjudication, grounding his theory in a 
perceived inevitability of a jurist's political choice between centralist and 
decentralist visions of Canada3. The realist focus upon the centralist/ 
decentralist dichotomy of Canadian federalism reached its zenith in English 
speaking scholarship in the social scientism of Noel Lyon4, the legal process 
1. B. LASKIN, "Peace, Order and Good Government", (1947) 25 Can. Bar. Rev. 1054 and 
reprinted in The Courts and The Canadian Constitution, W.R. Lederman, et., McClelland 
& Stewart, 1964. 
2. "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics", (1971), 4 Can. J. Pol. Sc. 361. 
3. LEDERMAN'S general theory is first set out in "The Common Law System in Canada", in 
E. McWhinney, Canadian Jurisprudence: The Civil Law And Common Law In Canada, 
Toronto, Carswell, 1958, reprinted in W. Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional 
dilemmas, Toronto Butterworths, 1981. It is elaborated in "Classification of Laws and the 
British North America Act", in J. A. CORRY, et al., Legal essays in honour of Arthur 
Moxon, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1953, and reprinted in LEDERMAN, id., c. 12, and in 
LEDERMAN, ed., The Courts and the Canadian Constitution, Toronto, McClelland & 
Stewart, 1967. Lederman's theory of adjudication is the subject of W. E. CONKLIN, Images 
of a Constitution, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1989, c. x. 
4. See generally, CONKLIN, Images of a Constitution, id., chap. ix. 
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analysis of Paul Weiler5, Peter Russell's political model of the Canadian 
Supreme Court6, and Patrick Monahan's exposé of the formalism in Canadian 
federalism judgments7. Each of the latter scholars has concentrated upon the 
apparently inevitable, oftentimes unconscious, political choices which lawyers 
and judges make about Canada when they resolve constitutional disputes. 
Each has assumed that the critical factor in that choice is one's vision of how 
centralist or how decentralist the Canadian political structure ought to be. 
Now, I have aimed to show elsewhere that both English-speaking and 
Quebec commentaries about Canadian federalism have concerned a far 
deeper and more complex set of issues than the centralist or decentralist 
character of one's vision of Canada8. In Images of a Constitution, I have 
5. See generally, P. WEILER, "Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making", (1968)46 Can. Bar. 
Rev. 406 ; "The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism", (1973) 11 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 225 ; and In the last resort ; a critical study of the Supreme Court Of Canada, 
Toronto, Carswell/Methuen, 1974. 
6. See generally, The judiciary in Canada : the third branch of government, Toronto, 
McGraw-Hill, 1987; "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms", ( 1983) 61 Can. Bar. Rev. 30 ; and Bold Statescraft, Questionable Jurisprudence 
in Keith Banting Richard Simeon eds., And No One Cheered : Federalism, Democracy and 
The Constitution Act, Toronto, Methuen, 1983, at 210 ; P.H. RUSSELL, "Judicial Power in 
Canada's Political Culture", in MX. FRIEDLAND, ed., Courts and Trials: A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1975, at 75 ; P.H. RUSSELL,"The Political 
Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in its First Century", (1975) 53 Can. Bar. Rev. 576, at 
576, P.H. RUSSELL, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada: Present Policies 
and a Programme for Reform", (1968) 6 Osgoode H.J. 1, at 5. P.H. RUSSELL, "A 
Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties", (1969) 19 U. Tor. L.J. 1099, at 128-9. 
7. "At Doctrine's Twilight : The Structure of Canadian Federalism", (1984) 34 U. of L.J. 47, 
reprinted in P. MONAHAN, Politics and the Constitution : the Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1987. 
8. In this essay I concentrate upon the federalism judgments and essays of Pigeon and Beetz. 
For their judgments regarding the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Charter of Rights, see 
generally W. E. CONKLIN, Images of a constitution, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1989, at chap, v 
and vii respectively. Although the Palriation Reference undoubtedly concentrated upon 
federalism and although the Majority of Six Reasons for judgment reflect the style, 
structure, and constitutional expertise of Beetz (see MACKAY, "Judicial Process in the 
Supreme Court of Canada : The Patriation Reference and Its Implications for the Charter 
of Rights, (1984) 21 Osgoode Hall L. J. 55, at 62, 63, I have omitted the Patriation 
Reference from my discussion in this essay. It is discussed at length in Images of a 
Constitution, ibid., chap. iv. It should be noted that many of Beetz's federalism judgments 
were made prior to the enactment of the Charter of Rights. In Chapter VII of Images of a 
Constitution, I suggest that his more recent judgments take on the character of a "balancing 
of social interests". See, e.g., Manitoba (A.G.)v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
110, at 129g-150e. Of course, to do otherwise is not easy in the light of R. v. Oakes, [1986]! 
S.C.R. 103, as Dickson and Wilson have found. For Beetz' application of the Oakes' 
balancing approach to section 1 of the Charter, see R. v. MorgentaIer,[l9%&] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 
122b-128c. 
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worked through representative judgments of every "subject-matter" of Canadian 
constitutional law, concluding that what has hitherto been understood as law 
collapses into a deep search for a response to the more primordial question, 
"what is a constitution ?" In responding to that first question, judges, lawyers, 
scholars and students project boundaries which demarcate legitimate from 
illegitimate legal knowledge. The boundaries sort out "what is the resource 
material of constitutional law ?", "what is ajudge's institutional self-image ?", 
"what weight should be given to institutional history?", "who counts in 
initiating constitutional claims ?", "should extrinsic evidence be admitted ?", 
and "what is the source of constitutional obligation ?""Reasons for judgment" 
express who the judge is as a person. Legal training has undoubtedly helped 
to mould legal consciousness to the point where lawyers share similar 
boundaries. The classic cases have involved a clash of boundaries. Absent a 
clash, law appears objective and neutral. But that very objectivity and 
neutrality disguises the deeper images of law which are embedded within the 
consciousness of the performers. That is why I have called law mere imagery. 
It is our image of what counts as reality that really counts. 
I wish to test this general thesis by looking closely at the expression of 
two leading Québec legal scholars/judges during the post War era: Louis-
Philippe Pigeon and Jean Beetz. I aim to show, in particular, that within the 
federalism essays and judgments of Pigeon and Beetz, there lies embedded a 
coherent picture of "what is a constitution ?" The boundaries of this picture 
inform us as to how Pigeon and Beetz understand reality; that is, "what 
counts as legal knowledge ?" If these boundaries can be identified, we may be 
rightly skeptical of the simplicity and weight which English-speaking legal 
scholars place upon the centralist/decentralist theme in federalism 
adjudication. 
It is important at this point to comment on my method. Traditionally, 
common law lawyers read a judgment in an effort to identify the abstract rule 
of law which is necessary in a judge's reasoning process. The latter rule is 
called a ratio. The lawyer then tries to fit that rule cohesively into the various 
subject-matters of federalism law. These subject-matters are generally set out 
in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution formerly named the British North 
America Act, 1867. Now, for reasons explained in Images of a Constitution9, 
I try to make myself contemporary with judgments as texts. I treat judgments 
as ajudge's expression of "who s/ he is" and this, in turn, hangs upon "how s/ 
he understands reality". Accordingly, judgments and academic essays can be 
read interchangeably in an effort, not to seek out legal doctrine, but to 
understand the boundaries or horizons of one's picture of reality. Whether 
9. See CONKLIN, Images of a Constitution, ibid., c. 1, esp. 12-15. 
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there is any other component to reality and, therefore, something more to 
federalism law than images, I shall leave to the side for the time being. 
1. "La Règle Fondamentale" of Louis-Philippe Pigeon 
1.1. The text as the constitution 
The first question for all constitutional analysis in Pigeon's eyes remains 
the same as that of his English-speaking counterparts : "what is the nature of a 
constitution ?" This first question underlies his early essays 10, his reaction to a 
proposed bill of rights", his reaction to the Fulton-Favreau Amendment 
Plan u, and his response to several constitutional claims as a Supreme Court 
Judge 13. 
A posited text, the British North America Act, 1867, serves as the 
starting point of Pigeon's image of a constitution. More correctly, Pigeon 
begins with only two sections ofthat text, sections 91 and 92. He describes the 
latter as "entrenched" in that neither level of government may amend them. In 
contrast, legislatures may amend sections 53 and 54 — without ado 14. In his 
first published essay, Are the Provincial Legislatures Parliaments ?, Pigeon 
concentrates entirely upon the exact words of the Act15. By reading the word 
"Canada" in section 17 of the British North America Act in the light of other 
sections where "Canada" is used, Pigeon expresses that "Canada" describes 
"the juristic federal unit" rather than a mere geographical entity16. The text, 
he concludes, posits parliaments "with sovereign authority" within their 
respective jurisdictions. Similarly, in The Meaning of Provicial Autonomy, 
10. L.-P. PIGEON, "Are the Provincial Legislatures Parliaments?" (1943) 21 Can. Bar. Rev. 
826; "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy", (1951) 29 Can. Bar. Rev. 1126; E. 
MCWHINNEY, "French Canada's Attitude to the Canadian Constitution, in E. MCHINNEY, 
ed., Canadian jurisprudence : the civillaw andcommon law in Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 
1958. 
11. Pigeon, Brief to the joint committee on human rights and fundamental freedoms (1948) 26 
Can. Bar. Rev. 706, at 712. Also see, PIGEON, "The Bill of Rights and the British North 
America Act", (1959) 37 Can. Bar. Rev. 66 and "The Supreme Court and the Division of 
Powers : Commentary", (1976) 14 McGill L.J. 55. 
12. PIGEON, "Le Sens de la Formule Fulton-Favreau", (1966-67) 12 McGill L.J. 403. 
13. See, e.g., R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 ; A.G. Can. v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 ; Ross 
v. Reg. of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 5; Burns Foods Ltd. v. A.G. Man., [1975] 1 
S.C.R. 494 ; Re. Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 ; A. G. Can. v. 
Dupond, DupondA.G. (Can.), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770; R. v. Häuser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984; R. 
v. Thomas Fuller Const., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695; R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940. 
14. Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198. 
15. (1943) 21 Can. Bar. Rev. 826. 
16. Id., at 832. 
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Pigeon challenges the claim of centralists by appealing to the text in sections 
91 and 92 l7. Centralists had paid "slight attention" to the "pregnant words" 
immediately following the POGG power, for example 18. Further, centralists 
had erroneously rendered an historical construction to the Act — erroneous 
because, quoting from Brophy v. A.-G. of Man.I9, "[t]he question is, not 
what may be supposed to have been intended, but what has been said."20 That 
is, meaning emanates inherently from the text, not the framers' intent. This 
constitutes "a fundamental rule of legal interpretation," he claims21. What is 
more, one can rely upon a text in contrast to the framers' intent. 
1.2. The fundamental rule 
Starting with a posited text — the British North America Act — as the 
source of the constitution, Pigeon then narrows his focus. According to 
Pigeon, the text posits one "axiomatic" rule22, "the fundamental principle"23, 
a "general rule"24, a "basic principle"25 with "a special character26. The 
context of this axiomatic rule is very straight forward : provincial parliaments 
as much as federal parliaments are "mistresses in their own house". In short, 
provinces are autonomous or free from the dictates of any federal parliament. 
In addition to the text, Pigeon grounds the general rule's existence in 
very different sources. First, notwithstanding the fallaciousness of the centrahsts' 
"historical construction"27, Pigeon continually appeals to Sankey's "inter-
provincial compact" or "original contract" image of Confederation : 
Inasmuch as the Act embodies a compromise under which the original Provinces 
agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of the 
rights of minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into the 
federation, and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequently 
erected. The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed 
to dim or to whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the 
17. (1951) 29 Can. Bar. Rev. 1126. 
18. Id., at 1128. 
19. [1895] A.C. 202 at 216. 
20. PIGEON, "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy", supra, note 17, at fn. 6. 
21. Id,at 1128. Also see how much weight PIGEON gave to the new text, the Canadian Charter, 
in L'effectivité des décisions de justice en droit public interne [constitutionnel]", (1985) 26 
C. de D. 995. 
22. PIGEON, "The Joint Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", (1948) 26 
Can. Bar. Rev. 706, at 714. 
23. Supra, note 17, at 1135. 
24. R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695. 
25. Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198. 
26. Supra, note 15, at 827. 
27. Supra, note 19-20. 
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federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of the 
provisions of ss. 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon the 
federating bodies.28 
Secondly, whereas a legislature or parliament may amend most sections of 
the British North America Act, 1867 pursuant to sections 91(la) or 92(1) 
without the aid of the British Parliament (such as sections 53 and 54), only the 
British Parliament may amend sections 91 and 9229. Thus, the general rule of 
provincial autonomy is "entrenched", to use Pigeon's term. Thirdly, Pigeon 
continually repeats Sankey's "mistress in her own house" dicta of the Persons 
Case30. Fourthly, he describes the Act in French Canada's Attitude to the 
Canadian Constitution as a treaty31. Finally, in 1951, Pigeon grounds the 
autonomy rule in Nature. Without laws, the relations amongst persons 
"would be governed by individual brute force."32 Indeed, he goes so far as to 
suggest that a political regime which promises absolute freedom would lead 
to communism33. Absolute freedom, he defines as "total emancipation of any 
one man". This, in turn, means the "total domination over all others."34 This 
obviously cannot constitute "true freedom". Accordingly, "[t]rue freedom 
means freedom under the law." 
One needed laws, then, for "any order of things. " But law-givers exercise 
"of necessity" very great power. "Obviously" any group which possesses 
"special characteristics" would wish to control its own laws. Hence, "[a] 
group forming what is sociologically termed a "nation" normally aspires to 
independence."35 Federalism serves as "an attempt to reconcile the need of 
military, political and economic strength, which large units can only offer, 
with the desire for self-government that is inherent in any human group 
28. Aviation Case, [1932] A.C. 54, at 70. Also see Sankey in Edwards v. A.-G.for Canada, 
[1930] A.C. 124, at 136, and in British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, at 520-1, 
both cited and discussed in PIGEON, Are the Provincial Legislatures Parliaments ?, supra, 
note 14, at 827. Laskin, in contrast, could see "no necessary relationship" between the "two 
founding peoples" conception and the text. See B. LASKIN, "Reflections on the Canadian 
Constitution after the First Century", (1967) 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 395, at 399. 
29. Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 at 1291. 
30. [1930] A.C. 124, at 136, and discussed in "Are the Provincial Legislatures Parliaments?", 
supra, note 15, at 827 ; "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy", supra, note 16, at 1127, 
and supra, note 22, at 714. 
31. Supra, note 9, at 25. Citing A.-G. for Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd., [1914] 
A.C. 237, at 253, and referred to in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King, 
[1916] 1 A.C. 566, at 579. 
32. "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy", supra, note 17, at 1126. 
33. Id., at 1132. 
34. Id., at 1132. 
35. Id., at 1126. 
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having distinct collective feelings."36 He expresses the same point in another 
passage : "[ajutonomy is nothing else than freedom under the constitution."37 
Pigeon's sociology has set the ground work for what one English-speaking 
commentator — Albert Abel — describes as the "logic" to sections 91 and 
92 38. 
1.3. The meaning of the autonomy rule 
Pigeon identifies three elements of the autonomy rule. First, "limitations" 
or "boundaries" mark out the space over which a social group or "minority" 
possesses autonomous control. Secondly, autonomy implies "free movement 
within the area bounded by the limitations."39 As he expresses it, 
[t]he true concept of autonomy is thus like the true concept of freedom. It 
implied limitations, but it also implied free movement within the area bounded 
by the limitations: one no longer enjoys freedom when free to move in one 
direction only. It should therefore be realized that autonomy means the right of 
being different, of acting differently. This is what freedom means for the 
individual ; it is also what it must mean for provincial legislatures and governments. 
There is no longer any real autonomy for them to the extent that they are 
actually compelled, economically or otherwise, to act according to a specified 
pattern. Just as freedom means for the individual the right of choosing his own 
objective so long as it is not illegal, autonomy means for a province the privilege 
of defining its own policies.40 
This is what Pigeon means when he continually insists that a provincial 
Parliament is "mistress in her own house." Thirdly, what sets the boundary 
line between autonomous behaviour and external constraint is "the law" for, 
without law, brute force would determine the boundary line41. Sections 91 
36. id. 
37. Id., at 1132. 
38. A. ABEL believed that logic permeated sections 91 and 92o(the British North America Acts, 
1867 to present. Hence, he could entitle his major theoretical essay : "The Neglected Logic 
of 91 and 92", (1969) 19 U. ofL. J. 487. The "logic" to the grand division in sections 91 and 
92, he believed, was grounded in his image of Canada (and the federal classes of subjects) as 
an economy and in his image of the provinces as societies. Although "highly abstract", he 
considered this grounding "a good beginning". Why? Not because it corresponded with 
social/political reality nor because it reflected the historical genesis and evolution of the 
country. Rather, because the genus of the two divisions in sections 91 and 92 represented the 
two more developed sciences of the social sciences respectively : economics and sociology. 
The federal classes embraced operations which were "the primary concern of economists" 
whereas the provincial classes served "primarily the concern of sociologists". Id. at 502. 
Accordingly, "the Act's scheme was comprehensive, intelligible and tidy." Id. at 512. 
39. Supra, note 17, at 1132-3. 
40. Id., M 1I32-3. 
41. Also see PIGEON supra, note 15. 
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and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867 are extremely important, then, 
in preserving civic peace for they posit the boundaries between the autonomy 
of a province and the autonomy of a federal parliament. 
1.4. The application of the general rule 
From Pigeon's standpoint, the general rule of provincial autonomy 
leaves little room for choice. Pigeon applies the general rule as if it were some 
clear rule in some specialised statute rather than an open-ended principle. 
When relevant, the rule crystallises with full force. Unlike a principle which 
only points the judge to a certain direction without giving him the answer, the 
autonomy rule applies in an "all-or-nothing" fashion. If circumstances render 
the rule relevant, the rule causes one right answer42. 
One can appreciate Pigeon's understanding of the "rule-like" character 
of the autonomy rule in three contexts. First, Pigeon feels compelled to apply 
the rule so as to render the Canadian Bill of Rights "invalid". In a Brief to a 
Parliamentary committee established in 1947 to consider what steps Canada 
should take to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, Pigeon 
submits that a federally enacted bill of rights "would clearly amount to a 
curtailment of the powers of these Legislatures."43 Whereas such a bill 
"would leave unrestricted the power of Parliament to alter the law at will, for 
the Provinces the enactment, if valid, would amount to a constitutional 
restriction of their legislative powers." Because human rights fall "mainly if 
not exclusively" within provincial authority and because freedoms are often 
regulated or restricted by both levels of government, legislative action is 
needed at both the federal and provincial levels at the same time. That is, the 
provinces effectively exercise a veto power over the implementation of any 
"comprehensive" bill of rights. 
Pigeon believes the general autonomy rule determinative in his other 
published discussions about bills of rights. In his early essay Why Provincial 
Legislatures are Parliaments, for example, he claims that the provincial 
autonomy rule already protects human rights since the rights of minorities 
had been a condition precedent to enter into a federation44. In 1959 he 
42. This distinction between a rule and a principle is discussed in W. E. CONKLIN, In defence of 
fundamental rights (Alpheen aan den Rijn), Germantown, Maryland, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1979, at 245-248. Although Ronald Dworkin makes the most of the distinction as discussed 
id., one can trace it back through the legal process school of 1950's to American realist 
writings (e.g. Pound). 
43. As reprinted in (1948) 26 Can. Bar. Rev. 706, at 712. 
44. PIGEON, supra, note 15 at 827. 
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criticises the draftsmanship of the Canadian Bill of Rights for ignoring the 
provincial autonomy rule. In particular, he complains that the preposition 
"in" in sections 2's "in Canada" and the general provision that "all laws in 
force in Canada... that are subject to be repealed, abolished or altered by the 
Parliament of Canada..."(section 3), have contemplated Canada as a geogra-
phical rather than as a federal juristic unit45. And this, despite the fact that the 
enumerated human rights and fundamental freedoms "obviously lie largely 
within the field of provincial jurisdiction ; they include "property", one of the 
cardinal subjects of provincial legislative authority."46 Furthermore, although 
the Bill purported to declare existing law, Parliament has "no jurisdiction to 
declare what provincial law is on any matter of provincial jurisdiction."47 
Finally, the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights "would go to the very root of civil 
power" and thereby subvert the provincial autonomy rule48. 
English-speaking scholars have been known to condemn Pigeon's approach 
to the Canadian Bill of Rights once he joined the Supreme Court49. But once 
one realises that judgments are a judge's opportunity to work out his deeper 
image of a constitution and once one appreciates the core to Pigeon's image 
of a constitution, Pigeon's Canadian Bill of Rights judgments are not the 
least bit mystifying. First, Pigeon envisions the Bill solely as a general 
declaration of intent or "rule of construction" rather than as "an entrenched 
legal principle" or "constitutional rule".50 This he imputes from the text of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights (which, in section 2, uses "construed" and "applied") 
plus the provincial autonomy rule. The alleged discriminatory legislation in 
Dry bones arose directly out of section 91(24) of the British North America 
Act, he believes. Section 91(24) is "obviously intended to be exercised over 
matters that are, as regards persons other than Indians, within the exclusive 
legislative authority of the Provinces."51 Equality before the law would 
require "complete uniformity" of legislative standards in all the provinces. 
Such uniformity would contradict the provincial autonomy rule. 
45. L.-P. PIGEON, "The Bill of Rights and the British North America Act", (1959) 37 Can. Bar. 
Rev. 66. 
46. W.,at67. 
47. W.,at68. 
48. W.,at69. 
49. See, e.g. P.W. Hooo, "Comment", (1974) 52 Can. Bar. Rev. 263 ; W.S. TARNOPOLSKY, "The 
Canadian Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court Decisions in Lavell and Burnshine : A 
Retreat from Drybones to Dicey?", (1974) 7 Ott. L.R. 1. Another example is in CONKLIN 
and FERGUSON, "The Burnshine Affair: Whatever Happened to Drybones and Equality 
before the Law", (1974) 22 Chilly's L.J. 303, at 305. 
50. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282, at 301,306. See also PIGEON, ne Bill of Rights..., supra, 
note 44 at 71 and Lavell v. A.-G. Can., [1974] S.C.R. 1349. 
51. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 303. 
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Pigeon's Bill of Rights judgments express the boundaries of his image of 
a constitution in that, secondly, the autonomy rule requires that parliament 
remain "mistress in her own house." Reading the Bill of Rights in the light of 
the general autonomy rule, Pigeon finds it 
inescapable that Parliament, by the enactment of the Bill, has not only 
fundamentally altered the status of the Indians in that indirect fashion but also 
made any future use of federal legislative authority over them subject to the 
requirement of expressly declaring every time "that the law shall operate 
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights.52 
Pigeon finds it "very difficult to believe" that Parliament has so intended : 
"[o]ne would have expected this important change to be made explicitly, not 
surreptitiously, so to speak." Why ? Because parliament is autonomous in the 
sense of being "mistress in her own house". From that characteristic of 
Parliament, Pigeon can easily conclude that "the clearly expressed will of 
Parliament in whatever form" overrides the general words of the Bill. 
The primacy of Pigeon's autonomy rule within his image of a constitution 
also explains his "division of powers"judgments. In Burns Foods Ltd. v. A. G. 
Man. a contract has been made outside Manitoba and, as such, it "clearly" 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the Manitoba Legislature53. The strict, 
seemingly visible boundary line between the complete exclusive freedom of 
the federal parliament and that of provincial legislatures prevents the latter 
from effectively controlling intraprovincial trade just as it prevents the federal 
parliament from regulating local trade. Issues of efficiency and desirability 
cannot override the permanence of the boundary line. 
Pigeon works out the ramifications of the autonomy rule in each of his 
other federalism judgments. In Re. Agricultural Products Marketing Act he 
describes the autonomy rule as "the basic principle of the B.N.A. Act."54 
From it, he deduces that the control of production, purchase and sale are 
local matters within a province's autonomy. In R. v. Thomas Fuller Construc-
tion he describes the autonomy rule as "the general rule of the Constitution of 
Canada".55 From this general rule he deduces the claim that the federal 
parliament may create courts only for the administration of federal, not 
provincial, laws. And in R. v. Häuser he believes that the autonomy rule 
conversely permits federal authorities to prosecute for violations of federal 
statutes in addition to contraventions of the Criminal Code56. 
52. Id., at 304. Emphasis added. 
53. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 494. 
54. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, at 1297. 
55. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, at 713. For other examples of the "givenness" of his autonomy rule, see 
cases cited supra, note 13. 
56. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984. 
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1.5. The character of a constitution 
The autonomy rule serves as the starting point of constitutional analysis 
for Pigeon. Is there any other resource material with which Pigeon works? 
Yes, rules. Rules constitute the whole of a constitution. In Drybones, for 
example, Pigeon emphasizes that "one must always bear in mind the very 
starting point of the Bill, namely, that the rights and freedoms recognised are 
declared as existing, not as being introduced or expanded."57 That is, he reads 
into the Canadian Bill of Rights the claim that the Bill presupposes existing 
posited rules rather than some ideal — directed natural law or social value. 
Secondly, in his "paramountcy" judgment of Ross v. Reg. of Motor Vehicles 
he urges that judges allow posited rules to stand if at all possible unless one 
rule is entirely repugnant to another58. Thirdly, Pigeon projects overall a 
totality of rule-making: what human behaviour the provinces may not 
regulate, the federal parliament may59. One set of rules may complement 
another set60. If there arises "a genuinely new problem which did not exist at 
the time of Confederation" and if one cannot find an enumerated rule in 
sections 91 or 92 to encompass it, there just must be some rule to authorise it. 
And the general residuary rule serves that function61. Finally, Pigeon pictures 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an instrument which posits 
rules in an "all-or-nothing" fashion62. The Charter's most important rule is 
the rule in section 52 that posits "the Constitution" as the supreme law of the 
land. 
1.6. The institutional self-image of Pigeon 
It naturally flows, then, that a judge's primary duty is to apply posited 
rules. Pigeon objects to the lower court judges in Drybones in part because 
they have "in effect" held that by virtue of enacting the Canadian Bill of 
Rights Parliament has "implicitly repealed... the fundamental principle that 
the duty of the courts [was] to apply the law as written and they [were] in no 
case authorised to fail to give effect to the clearly expressed will of Parliament."63 
Pigeon's judgments read as if this enterprise were like Euclidean geometry. 
57. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
58. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 494. 
59. PIGEON, The Bill of Rights..., supra, note 14 at 831. 
60. Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198. 
61. R. v. Häuser, [1979] I S.C.R. 984. 
62. PIGEON, "L'effectivité des décisions de justice en droit public interne [constitutionnel]", 
(1985) 26 C. de D. 995. 
63. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 305. Emphasis added. 
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The first axiom is the fundamental autonomy rule. From it one need only 
deduce secondary and tertiary rules. 
Admittedly, "a subjective element inevitably enters in the practical 
application" of secondary rules to "borderline cases".64 This particularly 
occurs with words used to describe degrees such as "inordinate" or "substantial". 
Similarly, the words "gross" and "free" are "of necessity imprecise and open 
to subjective appreciation."65 And admittedly, one may not allocate the 
boundary line between the autonomous conduct of provincial and federal 
parliaments "with mathematical accuracy."66 Further, the need for rules is 
"essentially a moral problem". How does Pigeon resolve what he sees as the 
apparently inevitable subjectivity of constitutional analysis? He rejects the 
use of a technique of "an exact science ascertainable in the same manner as the 
natural sciences."67 Moral problems may not be resolved "by mathematical 
formulas". Pigeon resolves the judge's dilemma of applying rules on the one 
hand against the inevitability of "moral (including legal) questions" on the 
other by leaving it to the legislature — not the judge — to make the moral 
judgments. That explains why the autonomy rule is so pivotal within Pigeon's 
image of a constitution. Each legislature — not the courts — possesses 
uncontrolled discretion to improve moral standards upon all persons within 
the area bounded by the limits68. Privy Council and Supreme Court judgments, 
he thinks, do not rest upon "a narrow and technical construction of the 
B.N. A. Act". Rather, such judgments are worked out from "a much higher 
view" which "firmly upholds the fundamental principle of provincial auto-
nomy."69 When courts must exercise choice, "French Canada's attitude 
naturally inclines towards provincial jurisdiction in such circumstances."70 
2. Jean Beetz's Neutral Constitution 
Jean Beetz, formerly of the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal 
(1953-70) and recently retired as a Supreme Court judge (1974-1987), shares 
Pigeon's priority rule of provincial autonomy. But Beetz adds something : he 
differentiates between the form and substance of a constitution. The super-
rule of provincial autonomy constitutes the substance of the constitution. 
Judges, as neutral participants, serve as the guardians of the super-rule. Their 
64. PIGEON in McWhinney, supra, note 10, at 33. 
65. PIGEON supra, note 17, at 1131. 
66. Id., ax. 1132. 
67. Id., at 1131. 
68. Id., at 1133. 
69. Id., at 1135. 
70. PIGEON in McWhinney, supra, note 9 at 33. 
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role is to regulate social facts in the light of neutral reason and considerations 
of justice. The court is an active source of reason rather than a mere mirror of 
society's morals, beliefs and customs. 
2.1. Substance and form 
Beetz distinguishes between the form and the substance of a constitution7 '. 
The form or style of the 1867 Constitution "est charactéristique des statuts 
d'interprétation restrictive." He continues that "c'est un document hautement 
technique et par conséquent hermétique" which "entraîne normalement une 
interprétation purement exégétique et littérale."72 By literally applying the 
text, judges have divorced the form of the British North America Act, 1867 
from its substance. This schism explains the wide fluctuations in the case law, 
according to Beetz. The judge's duty is to look beyond form to "its operation, 
at its effects and at the scale of its effects." One must examine "the reality of 
the matter or of the matters with which in effect they deal."73 Beetz himself 
demonstrates how one can search out "the reality" of the matters with which 
the B.N. A. Act and legislation deal in many of his federalism judgments74. 
Beetz shows in federalism judgments, how judges should focus upon the 
reality of both challenged legislation and the enumerated categories in 
sections 91 and 92. But what is the substance or reality of the constitution ? 
Legislative autonomy. The terms of the British North America Act, 1867 are 
meaningful only in terms ofthat unalterable reality. In their literal exegesis of 
the Act's words, judges have forgotten the substance of legislative autonomy. 
Their literal exegesis has thereby de-stabilised the super-rule, the latter being 
the substance of the constitution. 
Beetz advises that behind the substance there lies an abstract concept 
called "the Constitution". "The Constitution" possesses an objectivity and 
inherent imperativeness about it, independently of the interpreter. In tune 
with its objective nature, judges should interpret a text in a manner which 
"restât in changée le plus long-temps possible."75 Judges should aspire for an 
immutable interpretation in contrast to the realist, relativistic approaches 
71. BEETZ, Les Attitudes Changeantes du Québec à l'endroit de la Constitution de 1867, in 
CREPEAU & C.B. MACPHERSON, the future of Canadian Federalism, 1967, p. 113, at 116. 
72. Id., a\. 117. 
73. Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 452. 
74. See, e.g., Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 
754, esp. at 770-771,773-776 ; Bell Canada v. Quebec, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at 798h — 816e ; 
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 101a-106a, 115e-122a. 
75. BEETZ, supra, note 71 at 119. 
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presumably represented in the writings of Laskin, Lederman, Lyon, Russell, 
McWhinney, and other English speaking realists : 
[l']immutabilité de l'interprétation constitutionnelle supposait enfin un certain 
rejet des notions purement relatives, des données quantitatives, de l'innommé, 
de la jurisprudence dite "réaliste" et purement descriptive, des considérations 
d'ordre surtout fonctionnel ; elle supposait au contraire que l'on mette l'accent 
sur le qualitatif, l'approfondissement et la précision des concepts, la jurisprudence 
analytique.76 
A "constitution", he imagines, exists "out there" independently of a judge or 
lawyer. It is abstract rather than descriptive of social reality. It is permanent 
and overbearing. This imperative abstraction, this concept, which Beetz 
calls "the Constitution" lies behind and above the super-rule of legislative 
autonomy. 
Beetz's Anti-Inflation judgment reflects how he understood the federalism 
issues against the projected boundary of an abstract, autonomous "Constitu-
tion". 77 In that case, federal counsel argued that the inflation of October 1975 
had constituted a national emergency equivalent to war, pestilence or insur-
rection. Further, counsel argued, a parliament possesses "an implied power" 
to deal with an emergency for the safety of Canada as a whole. Beetz responds 
to these claims by describing the federal emergency power as "a temporary 
pro tanto amendment of a federal Constitution by the unilateral action of 
Parliament."78 "The legitimacy of that power", he continues, "is derivedfrom 
the Constitution.'''' More generally, Parliament possesses an implied authority 
to guarantee "the security and the continuation of the Constitution and of the 
nation". Quoting approvingly from Haidane in Fort Francis19, Beetz adopts 
Haldane's explanation that the preservation of the state itself justifies the 
implied emergency power : the power is "only to be found in that part of the 
constitution which establishes power in the state as a whole."80 Beetz leaves 
76. Id, at 120. 
77. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 463-4. Also see Baisaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60, where a 
police officer had refused to reveal whether a certain person had served as a police informer. 
Beetz discovered an old secrecy rule, developed in trials for high treason, which prohibited 
judicial disclosure of a police informer's identity unless the identity demonstrated an 
accused's innocence. Beetz described it as "a legal rule of public order". To permit 
provincial legislatures to limit the exclusionary rule would erode the indivisibility of the 
rule because the situation would vary from one province to the next and from criminal to 
civil proceedings. The judicially created rule would thereby be undermined. "The Constitution" 
protected the indivisibility or sanctity of the posited rule. 
78. Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 at 463. Emphasis added. 
79. Fort Francis Pulp & Paper Co. v. Man. Free Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695 at 704. 
80. For the Hegelian background and connecton to this conception of the state see generally 
ROBINSON, "Lord Haldane and the British North America Act", (1970) 20 U. ofLJ. 55, and 
WEXLER, "The Urge to Idealize : Viscount Haldane and the Constitution of Canada", 
(1984) 29 McGill L.J. 608. 
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unresolved whether the state and "the Constitution" are one and the same. He 
leaves no doubt, though, as to the abstractness of "the Constitution" itself. 
2.2. The substance of a constitution 
If the form of "the Constitution" is an immutable, permanent abstraction, 
what is its content or "substance"? After all, we noted above that Beetz 
admonishes lawyers to examine "the reality" behind the form of the constitu-
tion81. And we noted how Beetz has aspired to do so in case after case. But 
this incorporation of empirical data is not without a reference point. And that 
reference point constitutes the core to the substance of a constitution, for 
Beetz. The reference point for Beetz is a horizontal/vertical spectrum. Along 
the horizontal axis, there lie subject matters or classes which cover the whole 
of human endeavour: what the federal authorities cannot legislate, the 
provincial authorities can ; and vice versa. Within each category along the 
horizontal axis, different institutions (legislators, courts, regulatory agencies 
and public servants) may posit further rules and sub-rules which flow 
vertically under each subject matter. Beetz examines the real effects of 
legislation in terms of this horizontal/vertical spectrum. The spectrum is a 
"given", the substance of constitutional law for him. And Beetz is quick to 
point out its importance in judgment after judgment. In Bell v. Canada, for 
example, Beetz begins an extraordinarily long judgment (111 pages of the 
Supreme Court Reports) by setting out five "propositions", "principles" or 
"rules" which constitute the parameters of this horizontal/ vertical spectrum82. 
These rules are "well known and most of them need only be stated in the form 
of propositions", he emphasizes83. The parameters become the "givens" in his 
judgments of CN v. CourtoisM and Alltrans Express Ltd. v. Workers 
Compensation Bd. of B.C. et al.85. He incorporates empirical "reality" into 
that "given" picture of constitutional law. And all matters or facts, to be 
constitutionally relevant, are relevant in terms of the "given" rules from which 
he invariably starts his analysis86. If a matter or problem arises which is 
genuinely new in the sense that it is not explicitly or impliedly covered in the 
horizontal spectrum's enumerated categories, the cohesiveness and all inclusive 
81. See supra, note 73. 
82. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at 761a-766j. 
83. Ibid., all(,\b. 
84. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868. 
85. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 897. 
86. Also see A.-G. Can. v. Dupond, Dupond v. A.-G. Can., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770; Re Anti-
Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 ; R. v. Häuser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984, per Pigeon which 
Beetz adopts. 
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scope of the horizontal/vertical spectrum is complete even then: the new 
problem simply comes within the general residual federal category87. 
The crucial issue which this picture of law triggers is "what is the 
character of the rules which posit the boundaries within the horizontal and 
vertical axis ?" To this question, Beetz responds that the posited rules which 
constitute the core of his image possess a temporal character. That is, time 
legitimizes the rules; time imbues the rules with authority. In his essay, 
"Reflections on Continuity and Change in Law Reform," he stresses that 
posited rules must be understood against the background of habits and 
customs which the rules institutionalize. "[T]he older the rule, the better it is," 
he claims, "for it has proved its justice and usefulness by its very duration."88 
If a posited rule were unfair or harmful, "man would have quickly found a 
way to get rid of it."89 In contrast, a new rule is untried and unknown. Man 
mistrusts the unknown and is "partly afraid of it. " Indeed, the notion of a rule 
itself implies "a certain duration" : "[otherwise it is an ad hoc rule. It is 
lacking in generality. It is lacking in certainty and therefore it is under 
suspicion of being arbitrary and illegitimate."90 
Beetz works out this general picture of the temporality of posited rules in 
his Dupond judgment91. Dupond had attacked the constitutionality of a 
Montreal by-law and ordinance. The by-law had authorised the city's 
executive committee to "by ordinance, take measures to prevent or suppress" 
the holding of assemblies, parades or gatherings which endangered the safety, 
peace or public order. The executive committee had enacted an ordinance 
pursuant to the by-law. The ordinance prohibited "the holding of any 
assembly, parade or gathering anywhere and at any time on the public 
domain" for thirty days. 
The key to Beetz's response to the Dupond challenge is that posited rules 
constitute the exclusive substratum of a constitution. The Montreal by-law 
and ordinance did not allow for any uncertain, unknown, open-ended new 
rules. First, the by-law and ordinance had prohibited the holding of all 
assemblies, parades or gatherings, irrespective of religion, ideology or political 
opinion. Secondly, a municipal officer had not been granted an uncontrolled 
discretion to enact new rules. To the contrary. Authority was vested in the 
Executive Committee of the city. The Executive Committee could exercise its 
87. See R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984, per Pigeon, at 1000. 
88. J. BEETZ, "Reflections on Continuity and Change in Law Reform", (1972), 22 U. ofT. L.J. 
129 at 130. 
89. Id., at 130, fn. 2. 
90. Id., at 132. 
91. A.-G. Can. v. Dupond, Dupond v. A.-G. Can., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770. 
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authority only after the directors of the police department and of the city's 
law department had expressed "that an exceptional situation warrants preventive 
measures." The report had to give reasons, the reasons had to be justified in 
terms of the by-law's standard, and the prohibition had to be temporary. 
Thus, the by-law and ordinance had posited a clear, known, certain rule. 
Posited rules constitute the starting point of Beetz's expression in 
Dupon, thirdly, in that this known posited By-law contrasts with counsel's 
argument that the rule conflicts with the fundamental freedoms of speech, 
assembly, association, press and religion. Beetz reacts that the latter are 
abstract, vague, metaphysical and unknown concepts antithetical to his 
preoccupation with known posited rules. In Beetz's own words, 
I find it exceedingly difficult to deal with a submission couched in such general 
terms. What is it that distinguishes a right from a freedom and a fundamental 
freedom from a freedom which is not fundamental? Is there a correlation 
between freedom of speech and freedom of assembly on the one hand and, on 
the other, the right, if any, to hold a public meeting on a highway or in a park as 
opposed to a meeting open to the public on private land? How like or unlike 
each other are an assembly, a parade, a gathering, a demonstration, a procession ? 
Modern parlance has fostered loose language upon lawyers. As was said by Sir 
Ivor Jennings, the English at least have no written constitution and so they may 
divide their law logically. (W. Ivor Jennings, "The Right of Assembly in 
England", (1931-32), 9 New York University Law Quarterly Review, 217.)92 
Worse still, the right to hold public meetings on the public domain had not 
been posited, "being unknown to English law." Being unknown, such a right 
"did not become part of the Canadian Constitution under the preamble of the 
Brisith North America Act, 1867." 
2.3. Beetz's institutional self-image 
Notwithstanding the abstractness of the form — as opposed to the 
substance — of "the Constitution", Beetz's boundaries of "what is a constitution" 
delineate a specific role for ajudge. A judge's duty is to guard "the Constitution". 
The judge may neither amend the Constitution nor imperceptibly aid its 
erosion. "It is the duty of the Courts," he expresses in the Anti-Inflation 
Reference, "to uphold the Constitution, not to seal its suspension..."93 But 
how may a judge uphold "the Constitution" and prevent its erosion when, 
because it is an abstract formal entity, it is open to different interpretations as 
to its nature and meaning ? 
92. Id., at 798. Emphasis added. 
93. Re Ami-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 463-4. 
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Beetz resolves this dilemma by focusing upon the reasoning process 
justifying any one decision. So long as a judge appeals to external criteria, 
external to himself, his reasoning process remains neutral. Beetz describes 
this process in Les Attitudes changeantes du Québec à l'endroit de la 
Constitution de 1867 : 
En réalité, cette méthode d'interprétation, bien loin d'élaborer des règles 
neutres, objectives, désintéressées qui permettraient uniquement de trouver la 
signification d'un texte et l'intention de son auteur, dicte à l'interprète des 
maximes d'ordre public qui mettent en œuvre des critères fondamentaux 
auxquels l'on veut accorder la priorité même à rencontre, dans certains cas, de 
la volonté expresse du législateur.94 
The process of appealing to criteria, values, principles "above the rules and 
above the law" legitimates a particular rule or system of positive law 95. That is 
why in Dupond, for example, Beetz emphasizes that a demonstration is not a 
form of speech. A demonstration is "of the nature of a display of force rather 
than of that of an appeal to reason." Why so ? Because a demonstration, he 
thinks, is inarticulate. To be articulate and, therefore, inclusive within the 
term "expression" in the Charter of Rights, a picketing demonstration must 
be "of a kind which had as its purpose or object the conveying of information 
or opinion, or of persuading anyone to a point of view, or any purpose or 
object which could reasonably come within the term 'expression'," according 
to Beetz in Dolphin Delivery96. The inarticulate character of a demonstration 
prevents demonstrations "from becoming part of language and from reaching 
the level of discourse," as Beetz explains in his Anti-Inflation judgment97. 
Beetz connects the importance of a neutral reasoning process to the 
content of a constitution. The content, again, is made up exclusively of 
posited rules of which the provincial autonomy rule is fundamental. Rules are 
posited by two sources : legislatures and courts. Judges uphold the Constitution, 
first, by appealing to the external standards posited by legislatures. So, for 
example, Beetz explains in the Anti-Inflation Reference that a court may not 
hold the suspension of the Constitution legitimate unless Parliament has 
already expressly and unmistakably signalled the invocation of the emergency 
power98. Furthermore, judges may not legitimately make "findings of fact 
justifying even a temporary interference with the normal constitutional 
94. BEETZ, Les Altitudes Changeantes..., supra, note 71, at 115. His emphasis. 
95. See Beetz, "Reflections on Continuity...", supra, note 88, at 131. 
96. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and Dept. Store Union, Local 580, Peterson 
and Alexander, [1984] 3 W.W.R. 481, per Hutcheon J.A., at 495, whose reasons for 
judgment were adopted by Beetz on appeal in [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, p. 604. 
97. Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 464. 
98. Id. 
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process unless Parliament has first assumed responsibility for affirming in 
plain words that the facts are such as to justify the interference." The judge's 
role begins "after the affirmation has been made."99 Otherwise, ajudge would 
be invoking the emergency power on his/her own and making a subjective 
assessment of the facts. By appealing to the opinion of the Legislature (the 
other), the judge's reasoning process cleanses itself and maintains its 
neutrality. 
Short of suspending "the Constitution", secondly, a judge appeals to 
judicially-created posited rules precisely because of their externality to the 
judge. The older the rule, the more legitimate and neutral is the judge's appeal 
to the rule. In Baisaillon v. Keable, for example, Beetz discovers a rule posited 
centuries ago in trials for high treason. Time has placed the rule beyond the 
whims of the contemporary political process. By appealing to it, Beetz 
objectifies his reasoning process and maintains the neutrality to which ajudge 
is compelled to adhere. Similarly, in Dupond, he sees his first duty in terms of 
finding known posited rules. Counsel's abstract, vague and general terms fail 
to serve as the external clear rules which Beetz needs, he believes, to legitimise 
his reasoning process. And in Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum 
Wage Commission 10°, Beetz shows how important it is for a federal system of 
government that there be effectively clear, certain rules101. 
In Montcalm, the Minimum Wage Commission sought to recover wages 
and fringe benefits from Construction Montcalm Inc. on behalf of the latter's 
employees pursuant to provincial enactments. The employer claimed that the 
latter did not apply to employees of a Quebec enterprise which was doing 
construction work on the new international airport (Mirabel) located on 
federal land and pursuant to a contract with the federal Crown. On behalf of 
the majority of the Supreme Court, Beetz wrote that the employer's claim 
failed. 
Let us look at the employer's main submission to see how important 
clear, certain rules are to Beetz. The employer argued that aeronautics is a 
class of subjects which comes under federal jurisdiction and comprises the 
construction of airports, including the conditions of employment therein. 
Further, the employer alleged that Mirabel was a federal work or undertaking. 
In an interesting passage of his judgment,102 Beetz worked out the ramifications 
of the employer's main submission and these ramifications went to the need 
for certainty and clarity in the content of the constitution. For one thing, the 
99. See supra, note 77. 
100. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754. 
101. Ibid., at 775-6. 
102. Ibid., at 776. 
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record revealed little with respect to the nature of Montcalm's business 
operation. Further, the employer's claim "implied" that the nature of a 
construction undertaking varied with the character of each constructioon 
project or construction site. Beetz found the consequences of this claim "far 
reaching" : "constitutional authority over the labour relations of the whole 
construction industry would vary with the character of each construction 
project. "103 But why would that be of a concern ? Beetz immediately answers : 
"[t]his would produce great confusion." After offering an example, he insists 
that "I cannot be persuaded that the Constitution was meant to apply in such 
a disintegrating fashion."104 And further, "[t]o accept Montcalm's submission 
would be to disregard the elements of continuity which are to be found in 
construction undertakings and to focus on casual or temporary factors...",05 
Stability, certainty, continuity, and permanence join together as the core 
factors in this expression (judgment) of Beetz' image of "what is a 
constitution". 
3. Shared Boundaries 
How the Pigeon/ Beetz image of a constitution might differ from that of 
their English-speaking contemporaries on the Bench is left for another essay. 
That they share a coherent picture of reality with steadfast boundaries, there 
can now be little doubt. What, precisely, are those boundaries? How do 
Pigeon and Beetz distinguish legitimate from illegitimate legal knowledge ? 
That is, what constitutes reality within their image of a constitution ? 
First, Pigeon understands a constitution as discoverable in a text. The 
Canadian constitution is found primarily in a legislated text, the British 
North America Act, 1867 or, more correctly, sections 91 and 92 thereof. 
Except for his excursion into the nature of persons and societies, Pigeon 
appeals to both the British North America Act and judicial dicta as the source 
of the constitution, the latter of which is also a text. For Beetz, a constitution 
possesses a form and a substance. The form of a constitution is an idea or 
metaphysical abstraction hovering overhead. The super-rule of legislative 
autonomy and other posited rules, written in legislative and judicial texts, 
constitute the substance or reality of that form. For both Pigeon and Beetz, 
rules form the critical and effective source of constitutional law. Notwithstanding 
Beetz's appeal to some metaphysical and mystical abstraction called "the 
103. Emphasis added. 
104. Emphasis added. 
105. Supra, note 86. 
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Constitution" and his incorporation of empirical data into his characterization 
of legislated rules, he understands the core content or substance of the idea of 
"the Constitution" as a horizontal/vertical spectrum of rules. 
But we know that posited rules need not be the only or even the core 
element of a constitution. Other Canadian jurists have understood a constitution 
to be the social/economic reality (as in the case of Laskin, the scholar), 
institutional history (as in the case of Martland and Ritchie in the Patriation 
Reference), social, economic and political history (as in the case of Ivan 
Rand), moral/political values (as in the cases of Noel Lyon, Rand, LeDain, 
Mclntyre and others), or even speculative moral/political inquiry into the 
nature of rights, justice and other ideal-directed, abstract concepts (such as 
Madame Justice Wilson in her Charter judgments). But Pigeon would 
discard these other possible sources as irrelevant to the conscious enterprise 
of understanding constitutional law. Beetz most certainly incorporates social/ 
economic data into his classificatory process, but he does so with reference to 
his prior picture of the horizontal/vertical spectrum of posited rules. Pigeon 
and Beetz most certainly would admit these latter inquiries as important to 
being an enlightened or even a good person. Each would, no doubt, admit 
that perceptions of social fact, history, moral/political values, and even 
speculative moral/political inquiry enter into the judicial process of finding, 
deducing and applying the rules. But such considerations enter into Pigeon's 
image of what constitutes legitimate or valid legal knowledge accidently "by 
the back-door", as it were, only to the extent that the content of a rule directs a 
lawyer to incorporate history or the like or to the extent that the lawyer 
unconsciously incorporates such perceptions or values in his or her analytic 
process. We have seen that Beetz does incorporate legislative history and 
economic consequences into his search for the real matter of legislated rules. 
Once again, though, the latter pursuit is secondary to the "given" horizontal/ 
vertical core of posited rules. 
There emerges a second boundary within the Pigeon and Beetz prism of 
understanding the legal world. The rules, themselves, are posited. Although 
the rules may well have slowly evolved over time and although they may have 
grown from an imperceptible genesis, it is not until some institution has 
posited the rule that it becomes a part of a constitution. The rules, further, 
may well direct one to make inevitably value-laden choices. But it is the initial 
positing of the rule itself — not the moral character of the rule's content nor 
the ultimate choice — which legitimates the content of a constitution. Finally, 
Pigeon and Beetz might well believe that rules describe the social reality or, at 
least, that rules initially do so when first posited. But the positing of the rule, 
not the social reality underlying or causing the enactment of the rule, 
legitimates a rule as the substance of a constitution. 
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Thirdly, and interrelated with the above, rules constitute the starting 
point of constitutional analysis. Pigeon and Beetz presuppose a totality of 
rules in the sense that if the parent rules in section 92 do not authorise the 
control of human conduct, the rules in section 91 do so. The rules in sections 
91 and 92 and the rules posited pursuant to those rules exhaust all legal 
knowledge. Vague customary standards, moral/political beliefs, social/economic 
data or, indeed, personal images of a constitution themselves : none of these 
constitutes the starting point of constitutional analysis unless or until one can 
find them in a written rule, unless the rule has been posited, unless the posited 
rule has posited further rules incorporating these latter considerations, and, 
in the case of Beetz, unless the rules are posited coherently with reference to 
the horizontal/vertical spectrum. 
Posited rules act as prisms through which one understands all else in the 
world. Rules direct a lawyer to an answer. Indeed, a rule directs a lawyer to 
one right answer. The lawyer's or judge's reasoning appeals to rules to 
legitimate one's opinion/ decision. One can summarize the rules at the start of 
one's judgment or opinion, as does Beetz from time to time. One can "see" the 
rules physically on the page. Through the rational process, the lawyer deduces 
secondary rules from existing rules. Each exception to a rule constitutes a new 
rule. And later judges identify a new rule out of an earlier judge's conclusion 
in another case. Or, so Pigeon and Beetz picture the judiciary's elaboration of 
law. Pigeon and Beetz derive all rules from the super-rule and that, in turn, 
from a posited text. Pigeon's judgments particularly read as if the super-rule 
causes one, clear-cut answer. 
Fourth, rationality serves as the means to discover the rules. The manner 
in which Pigeon and Beetz work out the ramifications of the super-rule in 
their judgments manifests a rational technique. Admittedly, Beetz widens the 
tools of rationality to include economic studies, social statistics and social 
science date generally. Given the certainty of the horizontal/vertical 
spectrum of posited rules, the application of the super-rule to the facts takes 
on a necessity of its own in each case. Pigeon and Beetz use rationality to infer 
intermediate conclusions from the given super-rule of provincial autonomy in 
Pigeon's case and the horizontal/vertical axis in Beetz'. The conclusions 
"necessarily follow". The conclusions, if logically sound in terms of the prior 
"given", simply must be accepted. Accordingly, what is, ought to be. Pigeon 
and Beetz picture a constitution (and law) as if rationality could actually 
cause a particular conclusion. Because one conclusion posits a rule from 
which one begins anew in the next "similar" circumstance, rationality effectively 
formulates or posits the starting rules in each analytic exercise. And all this 
reinforces a picture of law as objective somehow divorced from the boundaries 
of one's pre-judgments about reality. 
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What function, then, does a text — such as "Reasons for Judgment" — 
serve for Pigeon and Beetz? The text offers a language for the necessary 
discourse in which rationality is presumed to cause the rules. That is, the 
prime function of a statute or judgment is not to posit rules as Pigeon and 
Beetz assume at first glance. Rather, legal texts initiate the language — the 
terms, the concepts, the words, the style — for the lawyer and thereby 
reinforce the social monopoly which lawyers possess over the interpretation 
of the texts. 
Fifth, Pigeon and Beetz share an image of a lawyer as a scientist who is 
duty-bound to investigate the world beyond him/ her in an objective, impartial, 
passive and neutral fashion. For Pigeon, the lawyer/judge exceeds his or her 
role by questioning the content of any rule posited by a legislature. Autonomy, 
being analogous to individual freedom, means that a legislature can exercise 
unrestrained conduct (that is, posit any rule on any subject or person) within 
the posited boundary lines of the freedom. For Beetz, the objective world 
includes social/economic "matter" which the lawyer must expose in his/her 
enterprise of classifying legislation into the pre-existing horizontal/vertical 
axis. And Pigeon applies the super-rule of provincial autonomy as if the 
super-rule exists objectively in the external world of fact and as if rationality 
can deductively cause one right answer from the given super-rule in any 
circumstance. 
The final critical boundary shared in the images of Pigeon and Beetz is 
that constitutional law becomes imagery. A posited horizontal/vertical axis 
of rules constitutes the beginning of legal discourse for them. Yes, Beetz does 
urge lawyers to pierce the form of a constitution in order to strike at "the 
reality of the matter." But that reality is interpreted against a given horizontal/ 
vertical axis which is assumed to encompass — as a potential if not an 
actuality — the whole of human conduct. That is, Beetz's horizontal/vertical 
axis pre-censors the "reality" which he wishes lawyers to expose. Further, 
rationality serves as the technique to discover, elaborate or apply the horizontal/ 
vertical axis of posited rules in the social world. Thus, a constitution — or, 
more correctly, their images of a constitution — closes off any inquiry beyond 
the boundaries or parameters of their images. The jurist may not legitimately 
critique the content of the image from the outside in terms of the empirical 
social/economic reality on the one hand or the ends of Justice or Goodness 
on the other. Their image of a constitution as a horizontal/vertical axis of 
posited rules excludes an independently existing social reality or independent 
ends of Justice or Goodness as non-knowledge, as beyond the boundaries of 
the image. The image pre-censors both and to that end, the image is 
primoridal to the rules, the texts, the rational technique and the scientific role 
of the lawyer. What we have taken to be constitutional law thereby collapses 
into the prior image whose boundaries we have for too long left unexamined. 
